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Abstract 
 The energy industry has an important place in the policies of 
Vladimir Putin, who became the president of Russia in 2000. During this 
period, Russia’s economic and political power has increased through the rise 
of oil prices. Accordingly, Russia began to follow pro-active foreign policy 
on a global scale. “Energy Resources” used as a tool in foreign policy, are 
one of the dimensions of this proactive policy. In this study, how the energy 
resources are used in foreign policies of states is analyzed by the sample of 
Russia. Furthermore, the place of energy industry in the Russian economy 
and some of the outstanding companies operating in this industry are 
examined. On the other hand transportation policies (the energy corridors of 
Russia), performed inside and outside the country, are accompanied with 
some examples. Then, the role of energy is analyzed in the outputs of foreign 
policy followed by Russia. 
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Introduction 
In the post-Soviet era, Russia left its ideology based polices and 
started to follow an approach which aimed to shift towards the liberal 
system. New reforms were added to the ones introduced during the era of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. In the period when Boris Yeltsin ruled, a privatization 
program was put into practice for a rapid transition from the planned 
economy to the market economy. A distorted economic structure occurred in 
this process by leading to the formation of a quite limited, but powerful 
capitalist class as well as indigent masses. Meanwhile, Russian economy 
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found itself on the brink of the abyss when it faced with the Asian crisis 
(1997) (Sönmez, 2010: 39). During these years, the oil prices in international 
markets were quite low and this situation affected Russian economy 
adversely. Undergoing a restructuration process, the Russian state had to 
follow a passive foreign policy while trying to deal with its domestic 
problems. 
From then on, Kremlin began to concentrate its attention on the 
energy policies. In the Soviet Union era, the income thatproducedby the 
energy industry had formed an important portion of the budget. However, the 
Soviet Russia used to make production on the basis of a planned economy 
and its technological potentiality. The oil and natural gas pipelines crossed 
over the former Soviet Republics and the former Soviet allies in the Eastern 
Europe were constructed in this era. Since the 1960’s, the energy 
transmission lines were constructed into Western European states such as 
Germany. This situation became an important advantage for post-Soviet 
Russia, because it was able to export energy via these pipelines. Moreover, 
the other former Soviet Republics that used to compete with the Soviet 
Russia in this respect lacked this specific advantage. The routes of these 
pipelines were constructed in a way that would make the ex-Soviet republics 
and the east European countries dependent on Russia. But these pipelines 
were of old technology, thus they had a low productivity and a limited 
capacity for energy transmission. Therefore it was necessary to find new 
energy sources, to increase the production capacity of the current ones, to 
restore the energy transmission lines and to construct new ones. With this 
purpose in mind, the Russian state introduced a series of reforms which also 
aimed to attract foreign investors. Especially, privatization program was put 
into practice in order to increase productivity. Within the scope of this 
program, a limited number of the companies inherited from the Soviet Union 
were handed over to private companies and the rest of them to domestic 
ones. The magical formula which would boost the Russian economy was 
rediscovered: ‘the energy industry’. 
The economic and political transformation that Russia had been 
going through and its energy policies were supported by the primary 
representatives of the liberal system such as the United States of America 
(USA) and the European Union (EU). According to these Western powers, 
the ideological background of the Russian foreign policy that had troubled 
the Western world like a nightmare for almost seventy years could only be 
changed through the integration of Russia into the liberal system. Therefore, 
the economic and commercial relationships between the West and Russia 
had to be consolidated and a ‘inter dependence’ should be established. 
Enriching Russia would integrate into the liberal economic system much 
more andbecome a feasible market for the Western world. Having been 
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dominated after the Second World War, Japan and Germany were also 
‘tamed’ through similar methods after all. 
Vladimir Putin, having come to power in 2000, accomplished some 
reforms in the economic and political domains. Among them, there are re-
nationalization of some strategically important institutions and the 
termination of the sultanate of oligarchs. What Putin aimed to do was to 
make it possible for the Russian economy to grow at least two times more 
than the Western economies annually. Therefore, he concentrated on the 
energy policies. It is important to mention at this point that Putin wrote his 
dissertation on the issue of ‘foreign policy on the basis of energy’ (Onay, 
2007: 279-281). Since Putin came to power, the oil prices has increased in 
the global energy market, the pipelines that started to be constructed in the 
Yeltsin period have been completed, additional trade agreements have been 
concluded in the domain of energy and thus the share of the energy industry 
in the Russian foreign trade has increased. As a result of all these 
developments, the Russian economy has made a rapid developmental move. 
To express this development in figures:  
The high inflation in the Yeltsin period has stopped; 
wages and the purchasing power of ruble have 
increased. While the per capita income was 2.270 
dollars in 2000, it reached 9.700 dollars in 2002 and 
almost 13.000 dollars in 2007. By the year of 2008, 
Russia has grown approximately by 8 % every year, 
paid its internal and external debts and increased its 
foreign exchange reserves to 280 billion dollars and 
its gold reserves to 400 tones. Thus, it has got rid of 
its dependency on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the per capita income has gone up by 
about six times (Sönmez, 2010: 46). 
The four big countries which have developed the most in the recent 
years are defined as BRIC, representing the initials of Brazil, Russia, India 
and China, respectively. While the Western economies were traumatized by 
the global financial crisis in 2009, Russia appeared as an economic and 
political power again on a global level. Economically empowered Russia 
started to challenge the Western powers. The crises in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Syria show that Russia will not be hesitant to use force for its own interests 
“despite the West’. After the annexation of Crimea, Putin announced that 
‘the uni-polar system has come to an end” (Kavkaza, 2014: 
www.prisonplanet.com). 
The main theme of this study is based on the analysis of the energy 
policies underlying Russia’s economic and political rise that has been 
outlined above. In other words, this study interrogates what kind of 
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developments energy resources might trigger in the process of their 
empowerment in the foreign policies of states by focusing on the Russian 
case. This study will also attempt to explain why Russia, which utilizes the 
energy industry as a political tool in its foreign policy, features the role of 
energy via its carrot or stick policy and what kind of players and factors take 
part in this process. In brief, the study will discuss the nature of the 
relationship between the energy policies and the foreign policy of Russia. 
 
The Energy Card as a Foreign Policy Tool 
States, especially the great ones, make use of non-military methods to 
increase their economic and political power, shape foreign policies of other 
states in line with their own interests and create a sphere of influence in this 
way. The most widespread form of these methods is the use of economic 
factors as a foreign policy tool. Sometimes great state powers attempt to 
shape foreign policies of small countries through the method of foreign 
assistance. And sometimes they punish the small countries whose foreign 
policies they disturbing by activating such tools as embargo and boycott. 
Thus, it becomes possible for powerful states to have an impact on or govern 
the moves of dependent states through certain foreign policies. From this 
perspective, it is impossible to argue that the economic steps that 
governments take can be free from political targets. The reason that certain 
states choose to use their economic and commercial relationships as a 
foreign policy tool may be explained on the basis of three conditions (Arı, 
2011: 411-417): 
1. Make some promises to the dependent state by taking advantage of 
its needs and subordinate situation or threaten it economically, 
2. Take hold of rich natural resources and deprive rival states of them, 
3. Create a sphere of influence by forming economic satellites and 
relationships. 
In this context, countries that have rich energy resources may give 
privilege subordinate states in some respects (through a rewarding method) 
or impose certain sanctions on dependent states, and thus shape their foreign 
policies in a way that will be advantageous in terms of their own national 
interests. 
 Energy resources have a special place among the economic factors 
that are used as a foreign policy tool. Hydrocarbon resources have strategic 
significance and are found only in a limited number of countries in the 
world. Therefore, certain countries that have rich hydrocarbon resources 
such as natural gas and oil are able to transform these resources into a 
foreign policy tool. The first example that comes to mind in this respect is 
the oil shocks in 1973 and 1974. Because of the crisis started by the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Countries (OAPEC), the price of crude oil 
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per barrel, which was 13.61 dollars in 1972, increased by about four times 
and reached 53.94 dollars in 1974 (Darmstadter, 2013: 4). The oil shocks had 
many internationally important economic and political consequences. Those 
countries that had started the crisis had a certain economic welfare. However 
they were not among the greatest states in the world. Even so, they were able 
to affect the economic and political atmosphere of those countries that were 
more powerful than OAPEC states but dependent on foreign energy 
resources such as the USA, the United Kingdom, Japan and France. The oil 
shocks also affected ‘not only the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also the Cold 
War, relations within the European Economic Community (EEC), relations 
between the EEC and the United States, referred to as the North-South 
dialogue’ (The October 1973 energy crisis, https://networks.h-net.org :1). 
 Although certain economic tools were used in the oil shocks, the 
prime mover of the crisis was actually political. The oil card was put into 
action in the hope to deter the countries which chose to follow a pro-Israel 
policy in the Arab-Israel war from this attitude. During the 1973-74 Arab-
Israel war, the Arab countries separated third-party countries into three 
groups on the basis of their foreign policy regarding the war: the pro-Arab 
(friendly) countries, the pro-Israel countries and the neutral countries. And 
the oil card was used in three different ways in the face of these countries. 
The friendly countries did not suffer from any oil cut; however, neutral 
countries had to deal with it. The pro-Israel countries, on the other hand, 
were faced with an embargo (Ülger, 2002: 150). After the crisis, the EEC 
started to follow a pro-Palestine policy and mentioned the rights of the 
‘Palestinian people’ in the summit organized in December 1973. In 1975, the 
EEC countries declared that the ‘Palestinian people’ had a right to express 
their ‘national identity’ and this might be possible only if Palestinians could 
reach their legitimate rights, including ‘their homeland’. Another important 
step that the EEC took in this respect was to issue the Venice Declaration in 
1980. The Venice Declaration mentioned Palestinians right of ‘self-
determination’ (Ülger, 2002: 151-152). The EEC continued to follow a pro-
Palestinians policy during and after the Madrid Conference (see Ülger, 2002: 
153-156). 
 The developing countries that are dependent on foreign energy 
resources were affected much more adversely by the oil shocks, therefore the 
welfare difference between the North and the South started to increase from 
then on. In addition, in 1974, the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
which was dominated by the developing countries then, granted the Palestine 
Liberation Organization the observer status and declared that ‘Zionism is a 
form of racism and radical discrimination’ in 1975 (https://en.wikipedia.org-
c). 
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 The oil card can also be used in order to influence the foreign policies 
of the countries that export oil. In the 1980s, when the Second Cold War just 
started, certain petroleum exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia pumped 
an excessive amount of oil and thus caused a decrease in the oil prices in the 
global markets. One of the reasons that the Soviet economy went bankrupt in 
the Gorbachev period was argued to be this decrease in the oil prices. In 
1985, the oil prices in international markets saw the lowest levels since the 
Second World War(Purtaş, 2005: 4). Similar policies are still being followed 
today due to the encouragement of Washington, which is disturbed by 
Putin’s policies. The Russian economy was affected particularly adversely 
by the decrease in the oil prices. It is necessary to point out that while the oil 
prices are determined in and through international markets, the natural gas 
prices are agreed upon through bilateral agreements concluded between 
exporter and importer states. Moreover, while oil is generally transported via 
tankers, natural gas is mostly transmitted through pipelines. Hence, bilateral 
agreements came into prominence and the exporter countries usually become 
the advantageous party. Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia especially 
makes use of the natural gas card effectively in its foreign policy. 
 There are various claims regarding Russia’s energy policies. For 
example, Russia’s official documents state that the main target of the energy 
policy is the Russian domestic policies. According to the Russian 
governmental decree, Russia’s energy policies concerning fossil fuel which 
has been exporting to many countries in Asia and Europe aims to utilize 
natural energy resources at a maximum level, create a sustainable economic 
growth, increase the life standards of the Russian citizens and consolidate the 
Russian economy (Rasporyajenie No: 1715R, 2009). It has been argued that 
Russia makes use of its oil and natural gas exportation as a political tool, i.e. 
as a power mechanism, especially in the face of the former Soviet countries. 
We can conclude from these arguments that Russia attempts to increase its 
power and influence by using energy as a fundamental tool (Houtari, 2011: 
121). 
 As can be seen in the following part of the study, attempts to be a 
monopoly in the energy domain of the former Soviet geography, Russia uses 
the energy factor in its foreign policy in three different strategic ways: 
1. Importing the energy resources in the former Soviet Republics at a 
discount and exporting them to other countries for higher prices.  
2. Following a carrot or stick policy for the countries which have come 
to be dependent on the Russian energy and trying to shape their 
foreign policies for Russia’s own national interests. 
3. Ensuring that the routes of the pipelines cross over either its own 
territories or the ones of the friendly countries. 
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Russia’s Energy Resources 
Russia is one of the largest oil-rich countries in the world. Russia can 
be said to be in a leading position in this respect since its energy resources 
are not only intense, but also diverse, which means that it harbors many extra 
energy resources. Therefore, it is one of the biggest energy suppliers in the 
oil and natural gas industry both as a manufacturer and as a seller. Hence, 
energy policies come into prominence for Russia (Chernitsına, 2015: 3). 
Russia is on the first, second and eighth rank in terms of the proven natural 
gas, coal and oil reserves, respectively in the world. Russia has 32% of the 
proven natural gas reserves, 10% of the explored coal reserves, 12% of the 
proven oil reserves and 8% of the proven uranium reserves in the world 
(en.wikipedia.org-a). In this part of the study, the situation of the oil and 
natural gas industries,which are the backbone of the Russian economy, will 
be analyzed. In 2013, nearly half of the federal budget and 68% of the export 
revenue were obtained via these two industries(US Energy Information 
Administration, 2015: 13). 
 
The Natural Gas Industry 
The importance of natural gas has been increasing day by day in the 
global energy market. The reason behind this is that natural gas can be 
utilized in various areas and the demand has been constantly increasing. 
According to some experts, the demand for natural gas will be going on 
increasing annually by 1.7% in average and reach 4.75 tcm in 2035. The gas 
consumption is expected to catch up on the coal consumption in time and it 
is predicted that the natural gas industry will play a key role in the energy 
markets in the future (WEO, 2011: 155). It is known the fact that Russia has 
the biggest natural gas reserves in the world and is one of the biggest 
suppliers in this respect. It ranks second in the world as a dry natural gas 
producer. Although many Russian companies have been increasing their 
natural gas production, Gazprom continues its domination as a state-backed 
company. According to the report issued by the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) on January 1, 2015, as seen in Table 1, Russia has the 
biggest natural gas reserves with 1.688 trillion cubic feet (tcf). According to 
2011 data, the flared natural gas reserve in Russia is approximately 1.300 
billion cubic feet (US Energy Information Administration, 2015: 11-13).        
 Although Russia has the biggest natural gas reserves in the world, but 
it is noted the top of the list in production and exportation. As can be seen in 
Table 2, Russia was the biggest natural gas producer in the world between 
the years of 1992-1998 and of 2003-2008, however it has lost this title to the 
USA in the recent years. According to the data provided by the International 
Agency, while the USA produced 689 billion cubic meters natural gas in 
2013, Russia produced 671 billion cubic meters. The Russian natural gas 
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production corresponds to 19.3% of the total natural gas production in the 
world (en.wikipedia.orb-b). Notwithstanding, such companies as Gazprom 
and Novatek tend to increase their production. Moreover, certain oil 
companies in Russia want to enter the natural gas sector (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2015: 12). 
 Russia started to export natural gas in the era of the Soviet Union. It 
entered into eight ‘gas-for-pipe’ agreements with such countries as West 
Germany, France, Austria and Italy between the years of 1968-1975. 
According to these agreements the Soviet Union would sell natural gas to 
these countries in exchange for natural gas and pipeline equipments. 
Moscow started to export natural gas to the Western Europe for the first time 
in the 1970s (The Soviet Gas Pipeline in Perspective, 1982: 17). In the next 
years, a dependency relationship may be argued to have emerged between 
the EU and Russia with more agreements to have been concluded. The 
income generated in and through the natural gas exportation became an 
important item over time in the Russian economy. In 2013, natural gas 
constituted 14% of the total revenue that Russia generated through 
exportation. With the decreasing trend in the natural gas consumption in the 
Western Europe as of the mid 2000s, Russia developed a new strategy to 
diversify its natural gas market and started to sell liquefied natural gas to 
Asian countries. In 2014, Russia tended towards the East upon the sanctions 
imposed by the USA and the EU. In the same year, Russia and China entered 
into an agreement to construct two pipelines between them. This agreement 
also aims at an annual 2.4 tfc natural gas trade between the two countries 
(US Energy Information Administration, 2015: 13). 
 
The Oil Industry 
 According to January 2015 data, Russia has 80 billion barrels proven 
oil reserves (www.cia.gov). As seen in Table 3, The production and 
exportation figures show that Russia ranks among the top three in the world 
in this respect. In 2014, it was stated that Russia was ‘the world’s largest 
producer of crude oil (including condensate)’ and ‘the third largest producer 
of petroleum and other liquids (after Saudi Arabia and the United States) 
(…) with average liquids production of 10,9 million barrels per day (b/d)’ 
(US Energy Information Administration, 2015: 1). Russia is the second 
largest crude oil exporter after Saudi Arabia. In 2014, while Russia exported 
152.6 billion dollars of crude oil, Saudi Arabia reached to 268.2 billion 
dollars of crude oil exportation. Russia’s export quantity corresponds to 
10.5% of the total crude oil trade in the world (Workma, 2016: 
www.worldstopexports.com). In 2013, the revenues from crude oil and 
products formed 54% of the Russia’s total export revenue (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2015: 7). 
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Similarly, in the era of the Soviet Union, the oil revenues formed an 
important portion of the economy. In the 1970s, almost one quarter of all the 
oil production used to be exported. This corresponded to a daily average of 
900.000 barrels of oil (The Soviet Gas Pipeline in Perspective, 1982: 17). In 
the post-Soviet era, importance of the energy industry increased. As 
indicated below, while the national borders shrank in the post-Soviet era, the 
amount of production increased hugely. It is possible to analyze the oil 
production and exportation process in the post-Soviet era in three periods. In 
the first period between the years of 1990-1996, the oil production decreased 
from more than 10 million barrels to less than 6 million barrels. During these 
years, the production faced with an annual degradation by 9% in average. 
This situation was one of the factors that would lead to the collapse of the 
Russian economy. The second period between the years of 1999-2005 
dressed the wounds of the Russian economy. During these years, the global 
price of oil per barrel increased from 18 dollars to 55 dollars. In accordance 
with this development, the annual production increased by 7.5% in average. 
This situation accelerated the Russian economy and created extra sources of 
income in the Russian private sector. In the third period between the years of 
2005-2014, the annual production decreasingly grew by 1.3% in average. 
The reason behind this deceleration was interpreted through the term of 
‘Low Hanging Fruit’. It means that Russia attained a rapid success without 
making much effort to reach its goals. Another fundamental reason behind 
this deceleration was the transition from privatization to nationalization 
(Henderson, 2015: 4). 
 
Dominant Actors in the Russian Energy Industry 
The prominent energy companies in Russia are influential both in the 
determination of the Russian national interests and in the formation of 
Russian foreign policy. A significant number of these companies are under 
the state control. Particularly some big companies such as Gazprom have 
been affecting government policies in many areas, foreign policy being only 
one of them. Thus, in this part of the study, companies that affect both the 
economic and the political life of Russiawill beanalyzed briefly. 
 
Gazprom 
As a state-connected company, Gazprom is one of the biggest energy 
companies in the world. As for the estimates by British Petroleum (BP), 
Gazprom has 16.5% of all the gas reserves in the world. Gazprom carries out 
84% of the total gas production in the Russian Federation, and 19.4% of the 
total gas production in the world. In addition, Gazprom is the only user of its 
pipelines which transport the gas across the global market (Mitrova, 2008: 
2). It is possible to state that Gazprom is the biggest company which serves 
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the political and economic purposes of the Russian state. As a dominant 
actor in the gas industry, Gazprom has been strengthened more by Putin 
under the state control. The Russian state holds 51% of the shares of the 
company (Finon and Locatelli, 2007: 4). 
 
Rosneft 
Rosneft is the leading company in the Russian oil industry and the 
biggest publicly-traded oil company in the world. 40% of the yearly oil 
production in Russia has been carried out by Rosneft. “Rosneft is a global 
energy company with major assets located in Russia and a diversified 
portfolio in promising regions of international oil and gas sector, including 
assets in 18 states in America, Asia and European continents.”Rosneft’s 
corporate activities include exploration, development, production, sale of oil 
and natural gas, refinement of crude oil and transportation and sale of 
petroleum products. These activities have been efficiently carried out at 
home and abroad. Rosneft is one of those companies which have a 
strategically important position. The main shareholder is OJSC Rosneftegaz 
with a 69.50% of the shares. And this company is 100% owned by the state. 
As for the other shareholders, BP holds 19.75% of the shares and the 
remaining part is public shares (Rosneft, 2015: www.rosneft.com). 
 
Transneft 
As a petroleum pipeline company, Transneft has the biggest system 
for petroleum transportation in Russia and the longest petroleum pipelines in 
the world. Transneft transports approximately 420 million tons of crude oil 
every year through its 80.000 km pipelines stretching between Siberia and 
the Baltic. Transneft has 400 pumping stations, 1000 storage facilities and 35 
refineries in 101 regions (ICONICS, 2010). The corporate governance in 
Transneft has some state representatives, too. Transneft is significantly 
influential in the determination of projects and strategies regarding 
petroleum pipelines (http://en.transneft.ru). 
 
Lukoil 
Lukoil is one of the biggest oil and gas companies in the world. More 
than 2% of the total crude oil in the world is produced by this company. 
Lukoil possesses approximately 1% of all oil reserves in the world. 16.4% of 
the total crude oil in Russia is produced by Lukoil and 15.7% of this 
production is processed (refined) in Russia. Lukoil is the biggest company in 
which private sector takes part. According to the figures of 2014, Lukoil’s 
annual revenue is approximately 144 billion dollars (www.lukoil.ru). 
As influential actors in the global energy markets, these companies 
can be used as a political and economic tool for pressure within the scope of 
European Scientific Journal April 2016 edition vol.12, No.11  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
88 
the Russian foreign policy. Having been rapidly privatized after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, these companies entered a period of 
expropriation in the 2000s. Therefore, it is possible for the Kremlin to use 
these companies, which have already been run by the state, directly in the 
policies regarding the other nations. 
 
The Energy Corridors of Russia 
Apart from exporting the natural gas and the oil that has been drilled 
from its own territories via transportation systems, Russia also transports the 
energy resources of some of the former Soviet republics to international 
markets through the pipelines. Therefore, Russia is able to manipulate the 
countries whose energy resources it transports and has an indirect right to 
comment on the decisions regarding these resources. Thanks to this 
interventionist policy, Russia is also able to influence the global oil and 
natural gas markets to a considerable extent. It is possible to say that Russia 
has an advantage in this respect, because of two significant issues: First, 
during the Soviet era, the pipelines that transported the oil and the natural gas 
resources from the Central Asia and Caucasus were constructed to cross over 
the Russian territories. In this way, interdependence occurred between 
Russia and these countries. Second, the pipelines that transported energy to 
the Eastern Europe had to cross over the Russian territories due to the 
geographical necessities. Therefore, Russia gains a strategic advantage in the 
face of its opponents thanks to the pipelines inherited from the Soviet Union. 
After all, constructing new pipelines is an extremely expensive endeavor. 
Another strategic advantage of Russia stems from its geographical 
magnitude. Being the neighbor of continents and countries that import 
energy such as Europe, Japan and China is a great advantage for Russia. 
Therefore, as part of its energy policy, Russia has been trying to realize new 
pipeline projects (www.gazprom.ru-b), which can be seen Table 4 and Table 
5. 
Russia has wide range pipelines network. Thus this country can easily 
affect the other countries using energy policy. For example, as can be seen 
above at Table 4 that Russia has gain power because of the crude oil 
pipelines both western and eastern areas. Russia’s energy policy not 
onlycontains crude oil pipelines but also natural gas pipelines. Both of them 
for Russia are so vital dynamics to affect the foreign policy and correlations 
between countries where is related with Russia about energy requirements. 
These relations dated back to Soviet era. Moscow’s energy exportation was 
began during the Soviet era. First, in the 1940s, the Russian gas was exported 
to Poland, although in small quantities. 3.4 bmc (billion cubic meters) natural 
gas that was sold to Europe reached 26 bmc in the 1970s and 1980s, and then 
109 bmc in the 1990s (Stern, 2005: 1). 
European Scientific Journal April 2016 edition vol.12, No.11  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
  
 
89 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia constructed many 
pipelines for energy transportation and thus took part in the global market. 
As can be seen in Table 4, Russia has been increasing its maneuverability in 
the foreign policy by conducting new projects. For example, it attempts to 
head not only for European countries or former Soviet republics, but also for 
new markets such as China within the scope of different projects such as 
Siberia – 2. Being in the need of 94-106 bmc natural gas by the year of 2010, 
China seems as becoming new market for Russia (www.gazprom.ru-c, 
2016). Russia has such a big geographical place that it can control energy 
policies on a few continents. It can be stated that both Europe and Asia are 
under control of Russia in the context of oil and natural gas pipelines. As can 
be seen at Image 1 Russia has a so complex pipeline network. In this context, 
one example from each category of the pipelines will be chosen that Russia 
has been using as a tool in its foreign policy and expand the subject matter in 
this respect. 
 
The North Stream Project 
Most of the gas flow between Europe and Russia used to cross over 
Ukraine and Poland. However, Gazprom started to search for new 
alternatives due to the problems occurred bythe time between Russia and 
these countries within the context of foreign policies. One of these 
alternatives is the North Stream Project (Chyong et al., 2010: 2). The North 
Stream project was first brought to the agenda in 1997 and officially put into 
practice on April 24, 2001. The need that Germany, Holland, France, 
Denmark and the UK have for natural gas is the primary reason behind this 
project (Baytekin, 2010: 134). 
 
The South Stream Project 
The southern corridor of the natural gas transportation system will 
supply the central and southern parts of Russia with additional volumes of 
natural gas. It means that the Russian industrial units and municipal services 
will develop in the regions through which the southern corridor passes. The 
South Stream Project will also step up gasification rates and secure 
uninterrupted gas supplies into the Turkish Stream. The total length of the 
gas transmission system will be 2,506.2 kilometers. The project involves ten 
compressor stations with a total capacity of 1516 MW. Once the southern 
corridor gas pipeline system is put into practice, it will transport 63 bcm 
natural gas every year. The project has been planned to be completed 
between the years of 2010-2017. The line in question covers approximately 8 
regions in the Russian territory. These are Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Saratov, 
Volgograd, Voronezh, Rostov Krasnodar and the Republic of Moldova 
(www.gazprom.com). In addition, energy which comes from Russia will be 
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carried into Central and Southern Europe by the Southern Stream Project 
(http://www.iefe.unibocconi.it/). 
 
The Natural Gas Pipeline of Yamal – Europe 2 
The fundamental purpose of this pipeline is to transport the 4/5 of the 
natural gas that is drilled from the Russian territory over Ukraine and the 
remaining 1/5 over Belarus to Europe. Starting from the Yamal Peninsula, 
the line reaches Germany through Belarus and Poland by passing through 
approximately 4000 kilometers. Before the crisis arisen between Russia and 
Ukraine, the pipeline of Yamal – Europe 2 was actually intended for another 
route which would transport the Russian natural gas to Austria and Italy 
through Poland and Slovakia. In addition to the Ukrainian crisis, Russia and 
Poland could not agree upon the construction of the second part of the line. 
Following these developments, Russia began to concentrate on the northern 
pipeline instead of this project. According to Gazprom, the northern pipeline 
project will generate more economic profit anyway. In the meanwhile, 
Russia will be giving an answer to the inconsistent behaviors of Poland 
(Erbil, 2010: 112). 
 
The Role of Energy Industry in the Russian Foreign Policy 
Since the Soviet era, Russia’s energy policy has been based on the oil 
and gas industry. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union used to produce about 1 
billion tons of oil every year. In this period, Moscow pursued a politically-
weighted energy policy regarding the third world and the other republics in 
the Soviet Union. Moscow’s energy trade with capitalist countries, on the 
other hand, was based on pragmatism with the purpose of making economic 
profit in mind (Sudo and Kazankova, 1998: 1-10). Today the Russian oil and 
natural gas industry has become a key actor especially in the European and 
Asian market. As indicated before, it is the Russian government that has laid 
hands on these industries. In addition, the increasing influence of the people 
who had key roles as intelligence officers in the Russian political life has 
also increased the effectiveness of the state in this process. It has been 
claimed that the Russian companies follow a policy which includes the 
purchase of key energy fields, storage centers and pipelines in the Central 
and Eastern Europe. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia may 
sometimes remove subsidies and increase natural gas prices within the scope 
of its energy policies regarding the former Soviet republics. This also 
changes the prices in the global market (Woehrel, 2009: www.fas.org). 
Hence, Russia’s energy policies may change natural gas prices in the global 
markets. 
Russia follows certain methods which are similar to the global 
policies carried out by the USA. In the post-cold war era, the USA has 
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followed a foreign policy strategy based on some economic, political and 
other precautions in the face of its opponents that have a geo-economically 
important position such as China, Russia, India and Germany. The biggest 
opponent of the USA in terms of military capacity and energy resources is 
Russia. The global economic crisis that may arise at this point limits the 
increase of the quantities demanded from the energy suppliers. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the USA followed a policy which included the changes in the oil 
prices and in the pipeline roots that it used to transport energy resources. 
This policy had an impact on the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Today 
Russia has been using similar methods (Ageev and Loginov, 2014: 33). 
Since the 2000s, there has been a mutual relationship between the Russian 
energy policy and the energy prices in the global markets. The increasing 
energy prices have permitted to Russia to grow more powerful and more 
proactive in its foreign policy. The severity of the problems that Ukraine and 
Georgia have been recently challenging with can be given as an example to 
this situation. Today the Western World faces an enormous corporate state, 
that is, Russia. This corporate state draws its power from fuel oil and natural 
gas. Governed with a semi-authoritarian system with geopolitical goals, 
Russia is able to use its political alliances as well as its natural gas and oil 
reserves. Gazprom emerges as the most important tool for the foreign policy 
at this point (Goldthau, 2008: 53-54). 
Russia has been following these strategies in order to be an energy 
monopoly in the former Soviet geography(Telli, 2015: 356-357): 
1. Maintaining its monopoly on energy supply, 
2. Preventing foreign energy companies from controlling the Russian 
and the Central Asian energy areas and having a role in production 
and transportation, 
3. Determining policies not to let foreign gas producers enter the 
European market, 
4. Acquiring shares of foreign gas producers in order to be able to 
influence their sales policy. 
Russia uses the energy factor at its hand as a repressive tool in 
various ways particularly for the former-Soviet republics. For example, 
Moscow may sometimes cut off the energy flow on the basis of certain 
political factors, but claims that the decision is based on “technical 
problems”. Natural gas and oil companies with a monopoly power such as 
Gazprom serve not only as an economic tool, but also as a political tool for 
pressure. Some poor countries have become dependent on Russia especially 
in terms of natural gas and oil. InNygren’s words,using energy as a 
politically striking weapon, Russia tries to strengthen its hand during 
negotiations and political discussions by cutting off the natural gas and oil 
flow to these countries (Kanet, 2008: 9). 
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It seems necessary to point out that post-Soviet Russiaactually has a 
limited number of tools from which it can benefit in its foreign policy. These 
“limited” tools determine the nature of relationships that Russia establishes 
with the former Soviet republics and European countries and how it behaves 
to these countries. Moscow attempts to use its energy card and thus realize 
its economic and political projects. Among Russia’s political projects are to 
establish customs and states unions with its strategic partners, establish 
military bases in the strategic regions of these countries, support allies and 
weaken enemies. Russia’s primary economic goal is to increase the income 
that it has been gaining from energy sales. “This means reducing exposure to 
transit countries that can hold Russian energy sales hostage, forcing all 
customers to pay a market-based price reflecting EU price  levels, increasing 
ownership and control of energy infrastructure, and expanding access to 
high-profit markets.” However, Russia can sometimes be torn between its 
economic and political projects. In such situations, Kremlin has hard times to 
make a decision between two domains. “Thus, Russia is sometimes willing to 
sacrifice economic gain to assert political advantage, and vice versa” 
(Orttung and Overland, 2010: 74, 75). 
Russia has used the energy card particularly effectively under period 
of Putin’s governments. As mentioned before, during the first years of 
Putin’s government, the energy prices increased on a global level and Russia 
increased its energy exportation. These two factors enabled the Russian 
economy to gain a developmental speed. Putin’s government tries to sustain 
this economic development and restore Russia’s power as in the cold war 
era. Another goal that Putin’s government sets for itself is to increase 
Russia’s influence in the Central and Eastern Europe, Caucasus and the 
Central Asia. However, some outstanding authorities such as Andrey 
Illarionov, the economy advisor of the Kremlin, do not support the idea that 
Russia should use its energy resources as a weapon in its foreign policy. 
What is behind this argument is that such foreign policies will actually 
damage Russia’s own energy system in the long term (Smith, 2008: 4). 
As mentioned above, Russia continues to use the energy resources as 
the most important instrument in its foreign policy. It has even determined a 
series of principles regarding its energy policy. In this context, a study 
suggests that the current Russian government has already been planned its 
energy policies that it will pursue up until 2020. The fundamental strategies 
that the Russian government has adopted in its energy policies are as 
follows: 
• To ensure energy security 
• To use energy effectively 
• To form an effective budget 
• To ensure the ecological security of energy 
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Russian government itself shapes the fundamentals of the Russian 
energy policy strategic goals of which are given below.The use of 
underground sources; the management of funding of these sources; the 
development of fuel and energy resources in the domestic market; the 
evaluation of the role of energy in the regional and foreign policy; and social, 
scientific, technical and innovative policies are all analyzed within the scope 
of the energy policy of the Russian state. And the basic factor here is the role 
of economic regulations (in terms of prices, taxes, customs and market 
economy) (Rasporyajenie1234P, 2003). 
 
Three Important Strategies That Russia Uses in its Energy Diplomacy 
There are some parameters that determine how Russia is able to use 
its energy factor effectively within the scope of its foreign policy. While one 
of them is the fact that Russia imports cheap natural gas and oil and exports 
them for a higher price, another parameter is the carrot and stick method that 
Russia uses in the price negotiations with the countries that can be said to be 
dependent on Russia. Finally, Russia can choose to change the routes of its 
natural gas and oil pipelines if it has to follow a security policy or adopt a 
particular strategy. 
 
Strategy towards the Central Asian and Caspian Basin Energy 
Resources  
Russia’s energy policies are generally analyzed as having two phases. 
The first phase represents the time period before 2010, and the second phase 
is the time period after 2010. In the first phase, Russia tried to consolidate its 
economy and improved its infrastructure in order to have a say in the energy 
markets. Although the price of natural gas was increased, various programs 
were planned in order to struggle with the socio-economic shrinkage that 
would come about with the increased price of natural gas. Ranging from 
drilling energy resources to selling them, many reconstruction projects were 
carried out in this period, as well. In the second phase, the production has 
increased more than 1.5% together with the infrastructural works; in 
addition, various policies have been designed in order to construct 
transportation systems to transport energy effectively (Rasporyajenie 1234P, 
2003: 38-41). In other words, Russia attempted to complete its reconstruction 
process by using cheap energy resources in the first phase, and it started to 
follow an active policy in terms of energy in the second phase. Russia 
pursued a relatively passive foreign policy in its reconstruction period until 
1998. 
While Russia had a high income on the basis of energy during the 
Soviet era, not only Russia but also Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan started to have control on the natural gas and oil reserves in 
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the Caspian Sea region in the post-Soviet era. Having difficulties even in 
paying its debts in the beginning, Russia attempted to organize and be 
influential in the energy policies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Although 
certain multinational companies started to dominate the Caspian Sea region 
in the midst of the 1990s, Russia was advantageous anyway mainly due to 
the fact that it had long and organic relationships with these nations and that 
the transportation system had been made by Russia itself (Bilgin, 2005: 47). 
Hence, as per the energy policy that it followed up until 2010, Russia 
preferred to obtain cheap natural gas and oil from the former-Sovietrepublics 
and sell these energy resources in the European market with the price rate 
that itself determined. 
However, the pricing policy that Russia has been implementing for 
the energy resources of the countries in the Caspian Sea region affect the 
energy security of the EU in a negative way. First of all, Russia buys natural 
gas from these countries for a cheaper price and then sells it in Europe for 
higher prices. Second, Russia uses the gas that has bought from the Central 
Asia in the domestic market and thus the domestic consumption of energy 
resources gets relatively cheaper. Russia also sells the gas that has drilled 
from its own territories in Europe for similarly higher prices. Third, Russia 
makes Gazprom’s firms such as Itera, EuralTransGas and RosUkrEnergo 
richer by selling the Turkmen gas to Ukraine (Socor, 2008: 75-76). Since 
Gazprom remained incapable to meet the gas requirements of the Western 
Europe and Turkey, Russia needed and tended towards the Turkmen gas 
(Soltan, 2001: 185). Moscow was very well aware of the fact that Ashgabat 
was dependent on it due to the energy routes crossing over the Russian 
territory, thus used to cut off the gas at different times or did not pay its debts 
to Turkmenistan by alleging its credits to the countries that it sold the 
Turkmen natural gas such as Ukraine. In 1997, Russia demanded a higher 
transportation fee for the pipeline and negotiated with Turkmenistan to lower 
the natural gas price (Purtaş, 2005: 212). As a result, Russia managed to 
purchase the Turkmen gas for a price that was only one third of the 
international price and sell it for its normal market value, thus generated an 
income from the gap between these prices (Baycaunova, 2000: 260). 
 Putin has entered into new agreements with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan regarding the domain of energy. According to the agreement 
between Turkmenistan and Gazprom in October 2006, Turkmenistan would 
annually sell Russia 50 million cubic feet of natural gas and take 100 dollars 
for each 1.000 cubic meter. This was approximately 50% more than the price 
that Russia used to pay before. However, Gazprom was selling natural gas 
for 235 dollars to the West European states in the same period. Russia also 
concluded a joint venture agreement with Kazakhstan; within the scope of 
this agreement, the natural gas drilled from Karachaganak region, would be 
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processed by Gazprom and transported to the European market through the 
Russian territories. In 2007, the line that transports the Turkmen and Kazak 
gas to Russia (through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) was improved. Hence, 
the gas transportation was activated from the Central Asian countries to 
Russia (Telli, 2015: 185). 
 
The Carrot and Stick Policy 
Russia’s Carrot and Stick policy constitutes risk for some of the 
former Soviet Republics. This risk concentration stands out particularly for 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, these countries became dependent on Russia. Russia cuts 
hydrocarbon fuels of these countries partially or for a short period of time, 
which constitutes a foreign policy medium Russia uses against these 
countries. Although long-term cuts are a low possibility, they can be 
expected of Russia. Since 1991, Russia has been using energy as a political 
and economic tool. The number of events such as pressures on such 
countries as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia, in a way that covers most of Europe, accidents, energy cuts, selling 
out companies to others, coercive pressure policies, blackmails or threats 
exceeds 50. Almost half of them occurred during Putin’s government (during 
first five years of his rule) (Larsson, 2006: 3, 4). Some European countries 
have become dependent on Russia in the energy area through the agreements 
that they have concluded with Moscow. The level of European dependence 
to Russian gas is seen in Image 2. However, this situation includes many 
risks for Europeans. Finon and Locatellisummarize this situation as follows;  
manipulating the European market, risk of 
cancellation of the contract unilaterally, inadequate 
investments that can be withstand for long periods 
against the prices, circulating European energy 
market after constructing north stream and south 
stream, agreement with Turkey to discourage the 
construction of direct supply lines for Caspian gas to 
the European market, moves to reach agreement with 
major distributors, in particular Sonatrach, or even 
the takeover of distributors with a dominant position 
in specific national markets to partition markets 
(Finon and Locatelli, 2007: 2). 
Accordingly, in case of any crises between Europeans and Russia, 
Moscow gains the opportunity to put political and economic pressures on 
Europe 4. The disagreements about the price of the natural gas that Russia 
                                                 
4In this part of the study, a reference made to (Sönmez et al., 2015: 802)  
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exports to Ukraine affect not only these two countries, but also the entire 
Europe. By increasing usuriously natural gas prices before the critical 
elections in Ukraine, Moscow aimed the electoral victory of the proponents 
of Russia. Before 2006 Parliamentary Elections after Orange Revolution as 
well as the Presidential Elections in 2010, Russia resorted to this method. 
Russia wanted to raise the price of gas per 1000 cubic meter $50 to $230 in 
2006 and from $250 to $418 in 2009. However, upon Kiev’s rejection of 
both increases, Russia cut the gas transportation to Ukraine. Therefore, 
Russia punished Orange Revolution and intimidated Ukrainian people. This 
policy yielded some results; pro-Russian Yanukovych came through 2010 
elections (Sarı, 2015: 83-84). In 2013, protests against the pro-Russian 
government that did not sign the EU Customs Union Agreement led to 
another crisis between Russia and Ukraine. The Kremlin started to put 
serious pressures on Ukraine to pay its debts. Annexing Crimea as a result of 
the problems that occurred in the eastern region of Ukraine in this period, 
Russia at first decreased the gas transported to Kiev until June 2014 and then 
completely cut it. However, Kremlin took a step back and continued 
delivering gas. Yet, Russia limited the discount in the energy prices, which it 
uses as a foreign policy tool. The Kremlin left amargin in legal context for 
Europe and the international area (Stulberg, 2015: 112). Additionally, Russia 
brought forward a discount in the prices of the gas it sold to Ukraine between 
2006 and 2010. The fundamental reason for such a discount was its existing 
military base in Crimea (Orttung and Overland, 2010: 84). In fact, in 2010, 
when pro-Russian Yanukovych was ruling, Russia made a-30%-discount in 
the gas price (Orttungand Overland, 2010:75). In exchange for this discount, 
Ukraine concluded an agreement, which allowed Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol to stay there until 2042, with Russia. In 2012, when Yanukovych 
requested Russia to make a discount in the gas prices, Russian Prime 
Minister Medvedev expressed that Kiev also should be a member of 
Eurasian Economic Union established under Russia’s leadership (Sarı, 2015: 
85).  
Russia also has pressured Moldova within the context of energy 
policies. Upon the fact that the Kremlin doubled the gas prices, Moldova 
rejected this price increase. As a response to that rejection, state-subsidized 
Gazprom cut the gas flow to Moldova on January 1, 2006. The flow of gas 
was provided again after January 17 and the price of gas per 1000 cubic 
meter, which was previously $60, was raised to $100. Furthermore, Moldova 
had to sell Transnistria, which had 13% of the stocks at Moldova Gas 
Company controlling natural gas pipelines and other infrastructure of the 
country, to Russia (Woehrel, 2009: 11). As a result of the problems that 
occurred between Russia and Georgia in 2006, Russia cut the flow of gas and 
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electricity to Georgia. Throughout this year, Azerbaijan met the energy need 
of Georgia (www.trend.az). 
Belarus, one of the former-Soviet Union countries, is also dependent 
on Russia in terms of energy. On January 1, 2007, upon Belarus’s 
reservation about the high prices, Russia declared that it would stop the gas 
flow. Then, an agreement was concluded between Moscow and Minsk and 
Belarus committed to buy the gas by paying the double price (Woehrel, 
2009: 13). Against the propaganda for supporting fascism, conducted in 
Lithuania in 2012, Russian government decided toplace an economic 
embargo on this country. Stating that European Union remains silent on the 
events supporting fascism, Russia blackmailed Lithuania to close both the 
gas and the oil valves (www.5-tv.ru/news). 
Moreover, it is possible to say that countless numbers of states follow 
carrot-stick policy in order to force another country to do things in the way 
they. Bulgaria, particular Baltic States and Armenia among these countries 
have been exposed to Russia’s carrot or stick policies. Therefore, the energy 
resources that Russia uses as a source of political pressure, are its insurance.  
 
The Policy of Changing the Energy Routes 
Russia can change its energy routes with the countries it has 
problems. In the beginning of the 2000s, approximately 95% of the gas that 
was transferred from Russia to Europe used to be transported over Ukraine. 
This meant that Russia was dependent on Ukraine in terms of energy 
transfer. In some cases, Ukrainian government illegally hauled and used the 
gas coming through the pipelines. It was even reported that Ukraine sold this 
gas to the other countries. One of the reasons that Russia kept interfering in 
the elections in Ukraine was this dependency relationship (Torbakov, 2001: 
297-304). Later on, Russia tried to increase the number of its transportation 
routes and started to get rid of its dependency on the transit countries. New 
countries of transit have supported Russia’s policy in this respect. For 
example, Yana Toom, an Estonian member of the European Parliament, 
states that Ukraine’s gas transportation systems are 40 years old. Implying 
that Ukraine’s lines are old and technologically inadequate for a transit route 
from Russia to Europe, Toom emphasized that the North Stream Project 2 
should be used (http://rg.ru).However, according to another news agency, 
Russia may have to use Ukraine’s pipelines again in order to be able to send 
gas to Europe. The reason behind this is that it may be more expensive to 
construct new gas transportation pipelines. Notwithstanding, the agreements 
point to the fact that the gas transportation system passing through Ukraine 
will have been completely removed by 2022.Some experts state that even if 
the system in question is removed, it will not be appropriate to go for a 
choice that does not contain Ukraine in the future (http://www.gazeta.ru). 
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Another policy that Moscow adopted to create alternative routes was 
developed after the plane crisis arisen between Russia and Turkey. 
According to RiaNovosti, a Russian newspaper, Russia decided to stop the 
Turkish Stream Project in the context of the new energy policy shaped 
through the crisis arisen between Turkey and Russia on November 24, 2015. 
However, Russia continues to sell gas to Turkey due to the agreements 
concluded by the two countries (http://ria.ru). 
It is important to point out that Russia is not the only country that has 
gone for a change in the routes. As an extension to the sanctions imposed on 
Russia by the Western countries upon the annexation of Crimea, the EU 
pressured Bulgaria to deter from being one of the transit countries in the 
South Stream Project (www.euractiv.com). Consequently, the part in 
Bulgaria of the project was stopped in 2014 (Andreev, 2014: www.dw.com). 
However, after the crisis between Turkey and Russia occurred on November 
24, 2015 when Turkish warplanes shot down a Russian military aircraft, The 
Bulgarian authorities announced that the project would start again 
(www.focus-fen.net). 
Russia determines not only the routes through which its own energy 
resources will pass. It has also followed a policy to ensure that the Central 
Asian and Caucasian energy resources will be transported to the West 
through the Russian territories. In the 1990s, when transportation of the 
energy resources of countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan to international emerged, Russia used the status of the Caspian 
Sea5 as an excuse and tried to prevent signing oil or natural gas agreements 
between the relevant countries and Western energy companies. With this 
purpose in mind, Russia contributed to the internal disorder in those 
countries by even supporting coups. When Russia failed in these attempts, it 
pressured these countries to agree to transport energy to the West through the 
Russian territories. In the 1990s, Azerbaijan and Georgia were particularly 
exposed to the Russian pressure due to the reasons mentioned above.6 
                                                 
5As the largest closed water mass in the World, the Caspian has led to a discussion regarding 
‘whether it is a sea or a lake’ and created a sharing problem among the littoral countries. 
6Soon after AbulfazElchibey concluded certain energy agreements with some of the Western 
countries, a coup was staged. Heydar Aliyev, who came to power after Elchibey, concluded 
an agreement with some of the Western powers on September 20, 1994. This agreement was 
called the ‘Contract of the Century’. Two weeks after the agreement, another coup was 
staged now against Aliyev, but it failed (İşyar, 2004: 524). The Aliyev government gave 
10% share to the company of Lukoil through the agreement and tried to appease Moscow. 
However, Moscow started to pressure Azerbaijan from then on to have the pipelines on the 
Russian territories (Purtaş, 2005: 232). What Moscow preferred was to transport all the 
Azeri oil to the Black Sea through the line of Baku-Novorossiysk. It also pressured Eduard 
Schewardnadze not to let the oil be transported through the alternative line crossing over 
Georgia. However, when this pressure policy yielded no result, Schewardnadze was 
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Although,its repressive policies did not yield results in Caucasus, but 
Russia succeeded to transport oil of Kazakhstan and gas of Turkmenistan to 
the global market through its territories. The Kazakh government planned to 
transport the oil drilled from the Tengiz region of the Kazakhstan to the 
Mediterranean Sea via the BTC line. With this purpose in mind, a joint 
declaration was signed in October 1998 by the presidents of Turkey, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the energy secretary of the 
USA (observer). Russia opposed this project from the outset. As a 
consequence, it prevented the project of Tengiz-Baku-Ceyhan from being put 
into practice. The Kazak oil drilled from the Caspian Sea had been 
transported to the Black Sea trough the Georgian Supsa harbor dating from 
November 1997. However, Russia opposed this situation as well, and 
ensured that the oil started to be pumped to the Russian Novorossisk harbor 
at the Black Sea (Baycaunova, 2000: 268-270). Moreover, Russia and 
Kazakhstan agreed on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) which would 
transport the Kazak oil to the Black Sea through the Tengiz-Atırau-Astrahan-
Novorossisk line and started its construction in 1998 (Bayacaunova, 2000: 
263). 
 In the 1990s, Turkmenistan embarked on a quest for alternative 
routes to have its natural gas transported to international markets. The 
Turkmen government negotiated with Washington, Ankara and Tehran with 
this purpose in mind. The Trans Caspian project supported by the USA came 
to the fore in this period. However, it became impossible to find an 
alternative route to the Russian one due to Russia’s pressures, the breakdown 
of the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and the USA 
policy to exclude Iran from the routes of energy pipelines (Soltan, 2001: 
195-196).  
 Russia wants to keep Eurasia under control for geopolitical reasons as 
well as for its energy security. Eurasia is the crucial point in all energy 
policies in the world. Being the junction point where energy resources and 
global relations meet, Eurasia is the center of global decisions. Delivering 
regional resources into international corridors is one of the leading issues 
regarding the Central Asia. And the Western World wishes to have a corridor 
construction that will be independent from Russia (Naumkin, 1999: 1-17). 
The USA and the EU, too, have started to support alternative routes 
against the Russian policy to be a monopoly in the market of transit 
countries. As opposed to the Russian North-South corridor, the USA and the 
EU wish to consolidate the East-West corridor which excludes Russia and 
                                                                                                                             
assassinated (Pamir, 1999: 36-37). Russia’s pressure policies intended for Azerbaijan and 
Georgia remained inconclusive. The line of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) started to be 
constructed in September 2002 and the production began in 2005 (www.btc.com.tr). 
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Iran. With this purpose in mind, a series of negotiations were carried out in 
the hope to transport the Kazak and Turkmen oil resources through the BTC 
line (Telli, 2015: 138). Consequently, Kazakhstan at 2008 and Turkmenistan 
at 2010 started to transport some part of their oil resources via the BTC line. 
In this way, the CentralAsian countries managed to by-pass Russia for the 
first time and transported some part of their energy resources to the Western 
market by-passing Russia(Telli, 2015: 224). Moreover, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan have been tending towards Chine in order to alleviate their 
dependency on the Russian pipelines (Telli, 2015: 169). 
 In recent years two projects7 have come to the fore, one being the 
project of Nabucco Pipeline which will transport the Azeri and Turkmen gas 
to the European market and the other being the project of Trans-Anatolia 
Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) which will transport the Azeri gas to the 
European market. However, Russia has adopted various tactics in the hope to 
interfere with these pipeline projects. First, Russia came up with the South 
Stream Project as an alternative to the TANAP. Then, it proposed “to 
purchase all the Azeri gas for its market value’. Although this proposal was 
rejected by Azerbaijan, Russia managed to persuade it to conclude another 
agreement. According to this agreement in 2009, Russia started to import gas 
from Azerbaijan for the North Caucasian republics. “Russia also accepted to 
pay for the Azeri gas the same highest price as the one that it pays to import 
gas from the Caspian and the Central Asia. Wishing to continue its control 
over the natural gas reserves in the Middle Asia and the Caspian and be an 
element of pressure in terms of the transfer corridor, Russia approached 
Azerbaijan with quite reasonable conditions and thus prevented it from go 
towards the West completely’” (Telli, 2015: 367-369). Moreover, Russia 
pressured the countries that had planned to give gas to the Nabucco pipeline. 
In order not to let the Nabuccoproject to stand, Russia made a last move in 
2013 and applied a serious price reduction to the natural gas that it sold to 
Europe, thus discredited the Shah Sea Consortium (Telli, 2015: 373). 
                                                 
7Natural gas reserves were found in the Shah Sea region of Azerbaijan at the end of the 
1990s. Then, with its connections with Turkey, Greece and Italy, the Baku-Tbilis-Erzurum 
natural gas pipeline were constructed in parallel with the BTC line (Telli, 2015: 367). 
Thanks to this project, The Azari natural gas will by-pass Russia by crossing over Turkey 
and reach Europe, so that the EU will alleviate its energy dependency on Russia. The BTE 
project is the first serious attempt to ensure the transportation of the Caspian gas to the EU 
through a non-Russian route. However, only the lines that will cross over Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey have yet been completed. Consequently, the Nabuccodaha and Trans-
Anatolia Natural Gas Pipelines (TANAP) came to the fore in order to enable the BTE line 
reach Europe. As indicated before, the project of Trans-Caspian Pipeline designed in the 
1990s to transport the Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey remained on paper. However, 
the project of Nabucco aims to transport the Turkmen gas to Europe, as well. 
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Although Russia could not obstruct the TANAP, it stopped the Nabucco 
project and prevented the transmission of the Turkmen gas to the West.  
As a result it should be mentioned that, Russia has been 
implementing the following strategies to shape its policy regarding the 
energy routes: 
1. Preventing its energy resources from getting into the global market 
through alternative pipelines over which it does not have any control 
and thus putting these alternative pipelines in a disadvantageous 
position by constructing new pipelines to transport energy for more 
affordable prices, 
2. Constructing new pipelines and thus transport energy to the importer 
countries in Europe without any need for transit countries, 
3. Preventing non-Russian alternative projects from being put into 
practice by purchasing the distribution systems in Europe through 
Gazprom (Telli, 2015: 356-357). 
 
Conclusion 
 The ideological discourse that Moscow used in the Cold War era 
constituted one of the most important dimensions of the Russian foreign 
policy. In these years, the ideological expansionism was one of factors that 
enabled the Soviet Union to enlarge its sphere of influence on a global level. 
In the post Cold war period, Russia’s political power andability to maneuver 
have been increasing through the ‘energy factor’. Currently Russia is 
exporting energy instead of ideology. Moscow was able to control the Soviet 
Republics and the East Bloc countries by means of Red Army in the Cold 
War period. Similarly, Russia now tries to dominate the former-Soviet 
Republics through its economic power and energy policies. In brief, the 
contemporary Russian energy policies have placed socialism and Red Army, 
two important components reminding us of the Cold War period and the 
Soviet policies. 
 As indicated before, the Russian economy caught a rapid growth 
trend due to the reasons such as the rise of energy prices in international 
markets in the new millennium. Growing economically, Russia has done its 
best to consolidate its power in the former Soviet geography. Putin has 
increased Moscow’s influence in the region by first concluding agreements 
with the Central Asian countries regarding the domain of energy. After the 
blockage occurred in the Colour Revolution in 2005 in Uzbekistan, the USA 
lost some part of its influence in the region, as a result of which Russia got 
rid of its most important rival in the region. Countries such as Kazakhstan, 
Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus participated in the regional 
organizations established with the leadership of Russia,and thus being 
‘warded’ by her. Choosing to follow a foreign policy oriented to the West, 
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Georgia and Ukraine have been exposed to Russia’s power policy. 
Consequently, while some countries have become dependent on Russia 
because of the economic and political opportunities that it seems to offer, the 
countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine have gradually been 
moving away from it. 
 Russia has succeeded to make Europe dependent on it in terms of 
natural gas. Moscow’s energy policies have yielded some results which have 
consolidated Russia’s power in the region. However, it cannot be denied that 
these policies also include many risks. For example, The EU countries that 
are dependent on Russia get confused by its practices such as cutting off 
Ukraine’s gas or increasing the gas price that it used to pay. Therefore, they 
try to import natural gas from other countries in order to come over this 
dependency problem. This is the fundamental reason behind the projects 
which aim to transport the Azeri and Turkmen gas to Europe. Moreover, 
after the removal of the sanctions imposed on Iran, this country can be an 
alternative to Russia for Europe since it can both supply natural gas and 
become a transit country to transport the Central Asian energy resources to 
Europe. 
 On the other hand, it is impossible for Russia to do the same thing to 
all of its clients as the one it did to Ukraine. It would let Russia’s 
trustworthiness be interrogated and deprive it of the income it generated 
from the energy industry. This is also the reason behind the fact that although 
Russia imposed certain economic sanctions on Turkey after the planecrisis, it 
could not use its natural gas card. 
 Finally, it is necessary to point out that Russia’s great energy 
resources are both an advantage which constitutes the great power that it has 
and a soft belly waiting to be discovered. Russia’s economic power and 
foreign policy have become dependent on global energy prices. Although 
energy prices have been high in the new millennium so far, they show the 
signs of decreasing nowadays. If this decreasing trend continues in this 
manner, the Russian economy may get weaker as in the 1980s and 1990s and 
result with being passivated inits foreign policy again. 
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Table 1: Estimated Proved Natural Gas Reserves, as of January 1, 2015 
 
Reference:www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Russia/russia.p
df, p.11 
 
Table 2: Natural Gas Production 
 
Reference: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_natural_gas_production 
 
Table 3: Russia Crude Oil (including condensate) production and exports 
 
Reference: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=22392 
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Table 4: Russia’s Major Crude Oil Pipelines 
 
Reference: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS 
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Table 5:Russia’s Major Natural Gas Pipelines 
 
 
Reference: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RU, 2015 
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Image 1: Russia’s Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines 
 
Reference:https://www.google.com.tr/search?q=russia+energy+corridors&rlz=1C2AV
NG_enTR637TR637&biw=, 19.02.2016. 
 
Image 2: EU Gas Dependence on Russia 
 
Reference:http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-09-10/russian-retaliation-begins-
gazprom-limiting-eu-gas-cuts-poland-supplies-20-past-two-, 2016 
